Here's a list of the PE funds and Hedge Funds that decided to go public, either through IPO or through reverse SPAC mergers or some other ways. By nature, the funds they raise and the investments they make are long term, at least in PE, relatively illiquid. These listings are generally of the manager, the GP which is managing these different funds. Generally these funds themselves are available only privately. What is public is the manager. But in case of some hedge funds, even the funds raise capital on the stock exchange (BH??). (Question about sophistication of investor investing in a listed fund?)
The year 2007 with the listing of Blackstone, opened up the markets for PE managers. The Hedge Funds somehow haven't fared very well. It is the nature of the business itself. As Philip Coggan says in his Guide to Hedge Funds, "Hedge Fund is a state of mind".
Private Equity - public companies:
Generally manager is very important in HF - especially given return dispersion compared to PE funds. It is the flexibility the range of strategies...the agility - all this is very different from PE funds. And at the other end they behave similar to PE funds so distinction can be difficult.
Private Equity - public companies:
- Blackstone (2007 IPO) MCap - $201 billion, AUM: $1.21 trillion
- KKR (2010 - merger with listed vehicle) MCap - $126 billion AUM:$686 billion
- Apollo - 2011 (SPAC merger) MCap - $77 billion, AUM:$840 billion
- Carlyle - 2012; MCap: $23.41 billion, AUM: $465 billion
- EQT - 2019; MCap $42.25 billion, AUM: $310 billion
- TPG - 2022; MCap $23.03 billion, AUM: $261 billion
- Brookfield - long time ago listed (?) $98 billion market cap , USD 1 trillon + AUM
- Ares Management -2014; USD 59.16 billion market cap; USD 546 billion AUM
(Blackstone and Brookfield - trillion dollar+, Apollo, Ares, KKR Carlyle: $400 -$840 billion)
Hedge Funds - public companies
- Man group (1994) - oldest and largest publicly traded hedge fund - $2.6 billion market cap (GBP listed) AUM of $193 billion
- Platinum Asset Management Australia 2007 - from A$30 billion in 2015 to just A$8 billion today, with market cap hanging at only A$260 million (~USD 170 million).
- Navigator Global Investment Australia 2001 (?) - is a unique model: as a listed aggregator (partnering with hedge fund boutiques), it shows significant total AUM (~USD 86 billion) but a relatively low market cap (~USD 650 million).
- Third Point Offshore Investors Ltd. 2007 - Listed trusts, not manager
- Pershing Square Holdings 2014 - Listed trusts, not manager
- GCM Grosvenor Inc 2020
- Sculptor Capital Management (Och-Ziff formerly) - acquired in 2023 by Rithm Capital Corp a REIT
- Fortress 2007 (Private in 2017 when Softbank acquired it)
- Blue Bay Asset Management (2001, Royal Bank of Canada acquired in 2010)
- GLG Partners (listed in 2007 via SPAC, Man group acquired in 2010)
Some listed during 2007-08. After GFC most were acquired
Pershing Square and Third Point capital have permananet capital vehicles. Except Man group,and the Australian small funds, none have existed as public.
**
Further analysis with AI:
Market Cap vs. Fee-Earning AUM
| Firm | Total AUM | Fee-Earning AUM | Market Cap | Market Cap ÷ F-AUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blackstone | $1.21 trillion | ~$1.05 trillion | ~$200 billion | ~0.19× |
| KKR | $686 billion | ~$500 billion | ~$130 billion | ~0.26× |
| Apollo | $840 billion | ~$640 billion | ~$79 billion | ~0.12× |
| Brookfield (BAM) | $1.0 trillion+ | ~$460 billion | ~$97 billion | ~0.21× |
| Ares | $546 billion | ~$410 billion | ~$60 billion | ~0.15× |
| Carlyle | $465 billion | ~$295 billion | ~$22 billion | ~0.07× |
| TPG | $261 billion | ~$185 billion | ~$24 billion | ~0.13× |
| EQT AB | ~$296 billion | ~$154 billion | ~$42 billion | ~0.27× |
| Feature | Public Hedge Fund Managers (e.g., Man Group, Pershing Square Holdings) | Public PE Managers (e.g., Blackstone, KKR, Apollo) |
|---|
| Core Business | Hedge fund strategies: long/short equity, macro, quant, event-driven, multi-strategy. | Private equity, credit, real estate, infrastructure, secondaries. |
| Underlying Vehicles | Often open-ended funds or listed trusts/closed-end funds. Investors can redeem periodically (subject to gates/lock-ups). | Closed-end funds with finite lives (10–12 years). Capital is called, invested, harvested, then returned. |
| Revenue Model | “2 and 20” style but under pressure → lower management fees, performance fees tied to hedge fund alpha (often subject to high-water marks). | Management fees (committed & invested capital) + carried interest (20%+ of profits over hurdle, at fund end). |
| Cash Flow Profile | Fee revenues more volatile, highly linked to short-term market performance. Performance fees can disappear in drawdowns. | Fee revenues more predictable (long fund lives), carry shows up in lumpy fashion but over longer cycles. |
| Investor Base | Mix of institutional (pensions, endowments, sovereigns) and retail via listed products (e.g., Pershing Square Holdings on LSE). | Primarily institutional (LPs: pensions, SWFs, insurance, endowments) with growing retail access (e.g., feeder funds). |
| Public Equity Listing Purpose | Gives permanent capital access (shareholders’ equity + ability to issue stock), plus steady management fees. | Converts the GP (general partner) itself into a corporation, monetizing management fees and share of carried interest. |
| Permanent vs Temporary Capital | Some vehicles (e.g., Pershing Square Holdings, Man Group PLC balance sheet) = permanent capital. Most hedge funds still rely on external investor flows. | Mostly manage third-party closed-end funds, but Blackstone, Apollo etc. now also build “perpetual capital” (insurance co. balance sheets, listed funds, REITs). |
**
AUM vs. Market Cap Multiples
Hedge Fund Managers (Publicly Listed)
| Firm | AUM (mid-2025) | Market Cap | Market Cap ÷ AUM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Man Group | ~$193B | ~$2.3B | ~0.012× (1.2%) |
| Platinum Asset Mgmt | ~$5B | ~$0.17B | ~0.034× (3.4%) |
| Navigator Global Inv. | ~$86B | ~$0.65B | ~0.008× (0.8%) |
| Pershing Square Holdings | ~$11B NAV | ~$10B Mkt Cap | ~0.9× NAV (trust structure) |
| Third Point Offshore | ~$6–7B NAV | ~$0.6–0.7B Mkt Cap | ~0.9× NAV |
| GCM Grosvenor | ~$86B | ~$2.5–3B | ~0.03× (3%) |
| Sculptor (before Rithm sale) | ~$34B (2022) | ~$0.7B offer value | ~0.02× (2%) |
Typical range: 0.5% – 3% of AUM, with investment trusts (Pershing/Third Point) closer to NAV (~1×).
Private Equity / Alternatives Giants
| Firm | AUM | Market Cap | Market Cap ÷ AUM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blackstone | $1.21T | ~$200B | ~0.17× (17%) |
| KKR | $686B | ~$130B | ~0.19× (19%) |
| Apollo | $840B | ~$79B | ~0.09× (9%) |
| Brookfield | $1.0T+ | ~$97B | ~0.10× (10%) |
| Ares | $546B | ~$60B | ~0.11× (11%) |
| Carlyle | $465B | ~$22B | ~0.05× (5%) |
| TPG | $261B | ~$24B | ~0.09× (9%) |
| EQT | $296B | ~$42B | ~0.14× (14%) |
Typical range: 5% – 20% of AUM.
**
PE firms: Trade at 5–20% of AUM, reflecting long-duration, sticky fees and growth platforms.
Hedge funds: Trade at <5% of AUM (except closed-end trusts that trade near NAV), reflecting volatile fee bases and lack of permanent capital.
Biggest differentiator: durability of earnings. Markets pay up for predictability.
In short: Hedge funds may be excellent alpha generators, but as listed businesses, they’re treated by public investors as risky, short-term dependent enterprises, unlike PE managers who have engineered themselves into durable, predictable fee machines.
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